A trade-linked carbon tax could sharply reduce emissions
October working papers outline conditional routes to large emissions cuts and examine the difficulty of separating voluntary corporate action from the effects of public policy.
A common carbon tax linked to trade agreements could reduce global emissions by 54% under a framework developed by the authors of an NBER working paper. Their quantitative analysis supports a carbon price of $138 per ton of carbon dioxide under a shared fund that redistributes some tax receipts across countries, subject to fiscal and information constraints.
The proposed fund addresses the uneven burden of carbon taxation across trading partners. Members would apply a common tax on the demand side, contribute part of the revenue within fiscal limits, and receive allocations designed to balance the burden across countries. The authors place this arrangement within a framework for integrating carbon pricing into the World Trade Organization, subject to institutional and political feasibility constraints.
Knowing who ultimately bears the tax is the main binding constraint in the authors’ analysis. Precise advance knowledge of its incidence across countries would raise the feasible carbon price to $265 per ton. The scale of the modeled policy therefore depends on information governments would need before setting it.
A second design gives governments more discretion and requires no transfers between countries. Each member must meet a minimum carbon-tax revenue requirement, choosing its own combination of taxes on supply and demand. Energy exporters choose supply-side taxes and importers choose demand-side taxes; the authors calculate a 47% reduction in global emissions under this arrangement.
Corporate emissions commitments raise a related question about how public policy affects the reductions attributed to private action. In a separate NBER working paper, the authors examine voluntary targets alongside carbon pricing, regulatory mandates, subsidies, and differences in policy across jurisdictions. They emphasize the difficulty of separating additional reductions attributable to voluntary commitments from reductions induced by government policy.
Voluntary corporate targets often mirror government goals and policies, and some firms benchmark internal carbon prices against existing carbon taxes and emissions-trading systems, those authors find. Their stated research challenge is to establish how much additional emissions reduction voluntary commitments deliver.